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I.

JURISDICTION
This

Honorable
for the
Rules

matter has

been certified

to

this Court

by the

Judge Thomas Greene of the United States District Court
District of

Utah,

Northern Division,

of Appellate Procedure, Rule 41.

jurisdiction

of the

Utah

pursuant to

Utah

The matter is within the

Supreme Court

pursuant

to Article

8

Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2-2(1) .

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Judge

Greene has

certified the

following question

to

this Court for consideration:
Does an action for termination of employment
based upon
the public exception
to the
employment-at-will doctrine for violation of
or refusal to violate federal, other state, or
Utah law, sound in tort or contract.
Defendants
certification issue

have attempted
and add

are essentially

motion previously

rejected by

facts

before this

enlarge

their own issues

First, Defendants

the

to

re-arguing a

Judge

for consideration.
summary judgment

Judge Greene, attempting

Court.

Judge

Greene's

Greene had

to argue

specifically

rejected Defendants attempts to include an extensive recitation of
the facts in the Certification Order.
apply the law to the
Court.

To do

facts once enlightened with the law

otherwise would intrude

federal court as the trier of fact.
the

denial of

He indicated that he could

Plaintiff's

upon the province

Nonetheless, and

Motion to

Plaintiff will address this issue below.

by this
of the

in light of

Strike Defendants'

Brief,
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Second, Defendants
mooted

by recent case law

That issue has been
the
be

assert that

the certified

from the United

issue is

States Supreme Court.

briefed and is awaiting oral

argument before

federal trial court and Plaintiff again asserts that it would
improper for this

Court to consider

certified and is solely

that issue as

within the province of the

it is not

federal court

to determine.

III. NON-CASE LAW AUTHORITY
In
mootness

light

issue,

Defendants'

portions

Security Act of 1974
require

of

of

the

contention
Employee

regarding

Retirement

the
Income

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq., may

interpretation if the Court

deems that is an appropriate

issue for the Supreme Court to consider.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff
employment
having

was

constructively

with Defendant

worked

for

Browning

Browning

discharged

on October

since 1953.

from

31, 1984,

Verified

his
after

Complaint,

paragraphs 7, 11, a copy of which is attached1 as Addendum I.
As

a

result

of

the termination,

Plaintiff

filed

a

lawsuit against Defendant Browning and Defendant Rich, alleging 1)
a violation of ERISA by manipulation of the Browning Pension

Plan
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to

coerce Plaintiff's

early retirement

terminate his employment;

as part

2) a breach of

of a

scheme to

an employment contract;

and 3) termination of employment in violation of the public policy
of the State of Utah.

Verified Complaint attached.

On December 21, 1988,
September 27,
Claims.
empted
but

The

1988, Motions
Court ruled

to

Dismiss Plaintiff's

that Plaintiff's claims

Non-Federal

were not

pre-

by ERISA, that the federal court had pendent jurisdiction,

dismissed the

claim)

Judge Greene ruled on Defendants'

Third

Cause of

without prejudice.

Motions to

A

Action

copy of

(public policy

based

the Order

Re Defendants'

Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-Federal Claims

is attached as

Addendum II.
Defendants then filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment or,

in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment on March 24, 1989, on
the ERISA and contract causes of action.
On

March

24,

Reconsideration and for
of Action in light of

1989,

Plaintiff

cause of
signed

a

Motion

Reinstatement of Plaintiff's Third
this Court's decision in Berube

Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
alternatively

filed

for
Cause

v. Fashion

Defendants responded and

requested the summary judgment of Plaintiff's third

action.
January 23,

The Court

ruled on

1990) denying

August

Defendants Motion

Judgment or in the Alternative Partial Summary
and contractual causes of action),

16, 1989,

(Order

for Summary

Judgment (Re ERISA

reinstating Plaintiff's public
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policy based cause of action, and denying summary judgment of that
cause

of action as

well.

A copy of

that order

is attached as

Addendum III.
Defendants then moved for an interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals

which was denied

A copy of that Memorandum Decision

1990.

on January

23,

and Order is attached as

Addendum IV.
Defendants
certify

issues

finally moved

to

the

obviously, granted on
that time to

action.
and

The U.S.

Court

District Court
which

was,

and to

at
have

public policy based cause

narrow issue for

A copy

motion

to

Defendants attempted

District Court agreed that was

that it determined

Court to consider.

U.S.

issues for certification,

facts of the

certified one fairly

the facts

Utah Supreme

August 22, 1990.

enlarge the

this Court review the

the

of

not appropriate

appeal, setting forth

appropriate and necessary

for this

of the Certification Order is attached

as Addendum V.
B.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

Plaintiff

asserts

that

appropriate for this Court to

it

is

neither

necessary nor

determine the issue that Defendants

have articulated for review, i.e. whether Utah law would recognize
the facts asserted
discharge

by Plaintiff

in violation of

that doctrine.

as sufficient for

public policy, as

(Brief of Petitioners,

a finding

of

Utah law recognizes

p. 5 ) . The issue that the
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federal

court

exception

articulated,

to the

only legal argument

facts outside

of those

Certification

Order.

set forth

has

Defendants are
were

by

Defendants

facts in Summary Judgment
court

whether

the

employment-at-will doctrine

contract, requires

trial

i.e.

sounds in

and not

to

a recitation

the federal

Court in

have thoroughly

dismiss

using this forum to
before,

the

argued

causes

of
its

these
and the

of

again try to argue

and improperly

policy
tort or

Motions and Motions to Dismiss

refused

unsuccessful at

public

action.
what they

using the

Supreme

Court by taking the fact finding duty away from the federal court.
The federal trial court is amply able to apply the law handed down
from this Court to

the particular facts

of this case, and

Judge

Greene has stated such.
In light of this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Motion
to

Strike Brief,

however,

Plaintiff will

assert the

following

facts to respond to Defendants' factual issue determination.
1.
1953.

Plaintiff began

his

employment with

Browning

in

manager

of

Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 18.
2.

Browning's

In

1982,

facility in

Plaintiff

became

Arnold, Missouri

general

and moved

to Missouri.

Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 20.
3.
in

paragraph

Plaintiff
3

of

its

objects to
facts

Defendants' characterization

inasmuch

as

it

Plaintiff's retirement from Browning was voluntary.

suggests

that

Plaintiff did

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
Brief of Respondent

Docket No. 400401

deleave Defendant Browning's employ on October 31, 1984.
has consistently

maintained from

however,

he

that

employment.

constructively

this lawsuit,

discharged

from

his

Verified Complaint, paragraph 11.

4.
opposed certain
division

was

the inception of

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

claims

he

unlawful actions

managers

of

was

discharged

proposed by other

Defendant

Browning

and

because

he

officers and
because

he

conscientiously carried out his duties as customs officer and as a
corporate officer.
5.
of

[him]

Verified Complaint, paragraph 23.

Plaintiff further claims that Browning's "discharge

for exercising

his

affairs of the corporation
duties
law

duty of

loyalty and

in the

and for conscientiously performing his

as Customs Officer as required by

of the United

care

the law of Utah and the

States violates the public

constitutes wrongful termination."

policy of Utah and

Verified Complaint, paragraph

24.
6.

Plaintiff

disputes

paragraphs

6

and

7

of

Defendants' facts as they are taken out of context, are misleading
or mischaracterize the facts.
the basis of paragraph 23
contention that

he was

In response to a question regarding

of Plaintiff's Complaint (regarding his
constructively discharged because

opposition to unlawful actions

of his

proposed by Browning officials and

because he conscientiously carried out

his duties as customs

and

corporate officer) Plaintiff indicated

from page 181 to page

206

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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of his deposition that his opposition to falsification of
documents

regarding importation

Firearms of
valuation

Japan; his
for

of

firearms

parts from

opposition to falsification

purposes

of

assessing

customs

the

Miroku

of inventory

Merchants

and

Manufacturers Tax upon Defendant Browning's Arnold, Missouri plant
inventory; his opposition to
use

Browning's

States;

allow Berretta Firearms of Italy

import permit

his refusal to short

transfer Browning
States; and his

to ship

firearms into

cut customs procedures

inventory from Montreal, Canada,
insistence on compliance

to

the United
in order to

to the United

with customs rules

and

regulations regarding the importation of golf clubs from Portugal,
all contributed to the decision to force him out of his employment
with Browning7.

Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 162-64, 181-206.
Plaintiff admits paragraph 8 of

Defendants' facts,

but refers the court to the preceding fact paragraph 6, and to the
actual

text

explanation

of

Plaintiff's

of the basis for

deposition

for

a

his allegations in

more

complete

paragraph 23 of

his Complaint.
8.

Plaintiff

inasmuch as it excludes
Gobel,

perhaps the

authority from
Plaintiff's

disputes

Defendants'

David Rich.

Board

Plaintiff believes

of Directors,

them would have authority

Affidavit in

Opposition to Defendants'

Support

fact

of

or

number

9

that Don

anyone acting

with

to terminate Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's Memorandum

Motion for Summary Judgment,

in

paragraph

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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34, attached hereto as Addendum VI.
9.

Plaintiff testified

concerning

importation of the pistols from Japan that he
another Browning officer
desired him to
that

as

it

Mr.

over the issue and believed that officer

abide by

Plaintiff
is

mischaracterizes
whether

the

letter and

by Mr. Gobel
the spirit

disputes

taken
the

out

facts.

Peterson

paragraph

of

context,

In response

felt

that

11

he

of

is
to

misleading

an inquiry

suffered

any

refusal to go along with

President

Corporation,

importation

of

Defendants'

repercussions because of his
of

the

Peterson Deposition, p. 162-166, 191-192.

10.
facts

to

of

had a conflict with

ignore the instructions given to him

Plaintiff was

customs laws.

the issue

Browning Arms
of pistols

from Japan,

as to
adverse

Ray Allen,

regarding the

the following

or

illegal

testimony and

questioning was given:
"A.

(Mr. Peterson)

Yes, I feel very strongly I did.

Q.

(Mr. Money)

A.

Bad-mouthing Peterson

What were those repercussions?
for just another

example of

his unwillingness to cooperate."
Peterson Deposition, p. 164.
11.

Plaintiff

Allen, President
refused

had a

telephone

conversation with

of Browning Arms Corporation,

Ray

wherein Plaintiff

to cheat with regard to the importation of illegal pistol

parts from

Japan which resulted

in Mr. Allen

becoming extremely

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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angry

with

Plaintiff.

conversation
with

Within

a

Plaintiff received

regard

to

conversations

Plaintiff's Affidavit

days

a telephone

Plaintiff's

were

few

telephone

call from

Mr. Rich

retirement.

recorded,

These

transcribed

in Support of his

to Defendants' Motion for

of this

and

telephone

attached

to

Memorandum in Opposition

Summary Judgment.

Peterson Deposition,

p. 203.
12.

Plaintiff

admits that

Browning officer when Mr.
that

certain Berretta

Browning
facts,

license, as
and

Browning
regarding

asserts

Arms,

the

he

had a

conflict with

a

Peterson, as Customs Officer, indicated

pistols

could

set forth
that it

be imported

in paragraph

was

same person

the importation of

not

Ray

12 of

Allen,

with

whom

under

Defendants'

the President
he

pistols from Japan

a

had a

of

conflict

and not another

Browning officer.
13.

Plaintiff admits that Mr.

Gobel was a stickler for

adherence to customs practices, but denies the characterization in
paragraph

13

of

characterization
reveals

Defendants'
of Mr.

facts that

Gobel.

A

was

reading of

Plaintiff's

the

deposition

that Mr. Peterson merely agreed to this statement, it was

not his description of Mr. Gobel.
14.
facts

this

Plaintiff

inasmuch as it

mischaracterizes

the

Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 192.

disputes

is taken out
facts.

paragraph

14

of context, is

Plaintiff did

of

Defendants'
misleading or

believe

that

his

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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insistence on strict adherence to customs practices played a
in

the

perception

however, Plaintiff
were

that

he was

uncooperative.

stated that he

thought that

came

back

to

uncooperative in
and forth (in
regard to

Arnold

was

wanting to get the

insisting that

in Morgan

there

15.
he says

that

Arnold

was

extremely

inventories transferred back
be followed

between the

with

Montreal, Canada

Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 193-94.

Plaintiff has
that

As a result the reflection

the customs laws

transporting inventories

warehouse and Arnold).

when

addition,

people who felt whatever they gave Arnold was acceptable and

that Arnold should go ahead and do it.
that

In

part

he was

no

reason to

unaware

of the

disbelieve Mr.
Montreal

Gobel

situation.

Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 192-194.
16.
facts

as

it

Plaintiff
is

disputes

taken

out

mischaracterizes the facts.
deposition

context,

16
is

of

Defendants'

misleading

or

What Mr. Peterson testified to in his

was that under a Generalized System of Preferences you

can import a commodity from a
of tariff

of

paragraph

if the

decide to honor

State

Department and

the country

attempting to get

country at less than the going rate
the Treasury

with such treatment.

Department

Browning

was

golf clubs made in Portugal to become qualified

for

that preferential treatment.

Don

Gobel traveled to Portugal to, among other things, attempt to

iron

the problems

out.

He

sent

Problems arose in Portugal and

a

memorandum

to

Plaintiff

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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outlining
delays

the understanding which turned out to be wrong and more

ensued.

[Plaintiff
happy.

Plaintiff

not going

testified "Don's

along

with his

reaction

memorandum]

to

that

was not

very

He did not tell me to cheat, but I knew he was not pleased

that I didn't accept his memo and proceed accordingly."
subsequently got
did

accomplish

the customs issue straightened
the goal

it wanted

Plaintiff

out and Browning

to accomplish.

Plaintiff's

Deposition, pp. 195-96.
17.

Plaintiff

disputes

paragraphs

17

and

18

of

Defendants' facts as they are taken out of context, are misleading
or

mischaracterize

the facts.

With

regard to

paragraph

Plaintiff actually testified that there was a problem
to

the Missouri

fully

set forth above

and also
that he
that
his

Merchants and

at paragraph 6,

in Defendants' fact
could not think

would support his
Complaint,

provide

Manufacturers tax

he

more information.

which

other information at

doubted

is more

Plaintiff testified

allegations contained in

although

with regard

in Plaintiff's deposition

paragraph 18.

of any

17,

further

paragraph 23 of
reflection

Additional discovery,

provide Plaintiff with additional information

the moment

would

however,

may

to which he has not

yet been made aware.
18.
facts

as

it

Plaintiff
is

disputes

taken

mischaracterizes the facts.

out

of

paragraph
context,

19
is

of

Defendants*

misleading

or

In addition to what is stated in fact

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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paragraph

19, Plaintiff

meeting with Mr.

further testified that

Gobel on

an unrelated subject

another

Browning officer,

serious

problem with the tax form that

Arnold

plant.

The

came

plant

in indicating

was

at

management of Bob Clark who had
that

time.

figures on the tax form it

that

there

inventory

That

having a

when Don

Jones,

that there

was a

had just come in from the

that

time still

under

the

been handling the tax forms up to

Mr. Jones indicated

thousand dollars.

he was

that if

he put

down the right

would cost the company several hundred
was the

were problems
valuations for

first indication

with regard

to

purposes of

Plaintiff had

the Missouri

the tax

tax and

forms at

Arnold.

Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 182-84.
19.

Plaintiff

discussed

the

inadequate information to accurately fill
Browning's counsel in Missouri.
to Morgan to be filled out.
Arnold, but
back

to Morgan

believes
officials
tax.

by Morgan

about the amount of

20.

out the tax forms

information was

forms were filled

that at least Don Jones wanted

ahead and do it.

having
with

Merchandise inventories were taken at

where the tax

neck for Morgan to do it and

of

He was told to send the tax forms

personnel, and the

Mr. Jones indicated to

problem

out.

taken

Plaintiff

him to lie to the county

inventory that was

subject to the

Plaintiff that it was a pain

in the

he didn't see why Arnold wouldn't go

Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 182-88.

Plaintiff agrees

with paragraph 20

of Defendants'

Docket No. 400401

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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that Mr. Gobel asked Mr. Jones

under-evaluation

of

nothing

regarding the

further

the

also

merchants

however, Mr.

Gobel

conversation

with Mr. Jones

to look into the matter of
tax in

matter.

testified that

instructions as to what to do

Missouri

and

Upon further
he

concerning the

never

heard

inquiry,

had

another

problem, he

gave no

if the inventory was in fact under-

evaluated, he did not tell Mr. Jones that the inventory was not to
continue
facts

to be

under-evaluated, and

to determine whether or

under-evaluated.
V.

VI.

he did

not check

not the inventory

into the

continued to be

Gobel's Deposition, pp. 132-33.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.
A.

THE
CAUSE
OF
ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
SOUNDS IN TORT.

B.

PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN SUFFICIENT FACTS TO
ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNDER THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN BERUBE.

C.

ERISA
DOES NOT
PRE-EMPT PLAINTIFF'S
PUBLIC POLICY CAUSE OF ACTION.

ARGUMENT.
A.

THE
CAUSE
OF
ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
SOUNDS IN TORT.

Contrary to Defendants' arguments, Utah has

clearly and

expressly recognized a public

policy exception to the employment-

at-will doctrine.

v. Fashion Centre,

1033 (Utah,

In Berube

1989), Justices Durham and

Ltd., 771

P.2d

Stewart clearly indicated
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that they

would adopt such a

cause of action.

Berube, at 1042.

Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion indicates he would likewise
recognize the

cause

of

action,

Berube, at

1051,

providing

a

majority of the Court on this issue.
In

post-Berube

cases

this

Court has

cited

the

two

justice lead opinion as authority in those instances where Justice
Zimmerman's concurring opinion agreed with the lead opinion.
Arnold v. Titan

Services Co.,

Berube as providing
the at-will

783 P.2d 541,

an implied and express

doctrine).

If there was

544 (1989)

See,

(citing

contract exception to

any question at

all, this

Court set the issue to rest in Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d
1096 where the Court states:
The post-Berube exceptions to the employmentat-will doctrine in Utah include termination
in violation of public policy.
Loose

at 1097.

Public policy has been expressly recognized as an

exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Having recognized a public
the more
tort

pressing issue is whether that cause of action sounds in

or contract.

exception

policy based cause of action

as

The

lead opinion

typically giving

canvasing of the states

rise

in Berube
to an

refers to

action

on this issue shows that

in tort.

this
A

an overwhelming

majority of states have recognized this cause of action as a tort.
Of

the thirty-nine (39) states

for violation

that recognize a

cause of action

of public policy in the employment setting, thirty-
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two
as a

(32) recognize the cause of action

as a tort, only three (3)

contract, and in four (4) states Plaintiff has not been able

to ascertain the type of action provided.
complete state by state

Appendix VII contains a

listing of the lead cases

There is strong reasoning behind the majority's

on this issue.

position that the

public policy cause of action is a tort.
The Arizona Supreme Court

in Wagonseller v.

Scottsdale

Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (1985) stated:
Firing for bad cause - one against public
policy
articulated
by
constitutional,
statutory or decisional law - is not a right
inherent in the at-will contract, or in any
other contract, even if expressly provided.
See A. Corbin, Contracts Section 7; 6A a.
Corbin, Contracts Sections 1373-75 (1962).
Such a termination violates rights guaranteed
to the employee by law and is tortious. See
Prosser & Keeton on Torts Section 92 at 655
(5th ed. 1984).
The

reasoning

was

similarly expressed

by

the

California

Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 610 P.2d 1330, 1334
(1980), where
recognized

it recognized that California

that a

contractual

wrongful

relationship may

act committed
afford

decisions "have long
in

the course

both tort

and

of

a

contractual

relief, and in such circumstances the existence of the contractual
relationship will not bar the injured party from
in tort.

The contract itself

may give rise

pursuing redress

to duties that,

if

broken, would be remedied as a tort.
Protecting the

substantial and important

public policy

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
Brief of Respondent

of the state requires

Docket No. 400401

the type of

with its potentially punitive
contractual

damages alone,

protection that a tort

measures, can provide.
employers

may choose

If

claim,
left to

to take

their

chances and pay the damages if caught because the deterrent effect
will simply not be present.
Defendants cite to
701 P.2d

Beck v. Farmers

795 (Utah, 1985) in

public policy

based

claim

Insurance Exchange,

support of their
should

however,

is distinguishable in that

covenant

of good faith and

sound

argument that any

in

contract.

it involved a

fair dealing, not

Beck.,

breach of the

a termination that

violated public policy as in the case at bar.
In Noye v. Hoffmann - La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12
Super.

A.D. 1990)

their public

contract).

discussed the

differences between

policy based cause of action (a tort) and a cause of

action for breach of
(a

that court

(N.J.

the covenant of good faith

Referring to

New Jersey's lead

and fair dealing
case for wrongful

dismissal in violation of public policy, the Court analyzed:
'Although a cause of action lay in contract
the employee had a right to maintain an action
in tort "based on the duty of [the] employer
not to discharge an employee who refused to
perform an act that is a violation of a clear
mandate of public policy.f
Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d
505 (1980). It was not the breach of contract
with the employee that gave rise to the tort
but the underlying motivation of the employer
which involved antisocial conduct detrimental
to society in general. The tort lay not in
the breach of contract but in the violation of
valuable social norms - denominated by the
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Court as clear mandates of public policy.
Noye, 570 A.2d at 14.
Defendants

further

argue

that

it

is

inherently

inequitable for the law to impose a burden that can be enforceable
by

the

imposition

independently

of

punitive

damages

tortious conduct.

The

in

the

absence

Missouri Court

of

of Appeals

responded to this argument eloquently:
The public policy exception is narrow enough
in its scope and application to be no threat
to employers who operate within the mandates
of the law and clearly established public
policy as set out in the duly adopted laws.
Such employers will never be troubled by the
public
policy
exception
because
their
operations and practices will not violate
public policy.
Accordingly, where an employer has discharged
an at-will employee because that employee
refused to
violate the law or any well
established and clear mandate of public policy
as expressed in the constitution, statutes and
regulations promulgated pursuant to statute,
or
because the employer reported to his
superiors or to public authorities serious
misconduct that constitutes violations of the
law and of such well established and clearly
mandated public policy, the employee has a
cause of action in tort for damages for
wrongful discharge.
Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985).
Defendant

Browning

or

any

other

employer

who

conscientiously conducts its relationships with its employees will
have

no

need for

concern

in

being

caught off

guard

recognition of a public policy based cause of action.

by

the
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Defendants cite Judge Anderson's decision in Howcroft v.
Mountain

States Telephone

(D.Utah

and

Telegraph Co.,

1514

1989) as somehow being determinative of the issue at bar.

Judge Greene, after considering
this

712 F.Supp.

very

point,

concluded

Defendants

is

recognized

in Berube

Anderson

not

did not

Decision &

Howcroft and hearing argument, on
that

inapposite.
was

rule

The

not at

upon or

Order, January

"Howcroft...,
public

issue
even

23, 1990,

cited

policy

by

the

exception

in Howcroft

and

Judge

discuss it.

(Memorandum

see Appendix)

Defendants,

however, inappropriately continue to use Howcroft as authority for
the public policy issue.
Defendants' reliance
779

P.2d 668

argued

(Utah 1989)

above, Berube and

the public policy based

on Lowe v.

is likewise

Sorenson Research Co.,

misplaced.

Loose clearly indicate
cause of action in the

As

has been

the adoption of
employment arena.

Lowe is not on point and makes no clear statements as were made in
Berube and Loose.
This Court has

clearly held that the

termination of an

employment relationship for a reason that violates substantial and
important

public

policy

is

overwhelming majority of the
of

action

sounds

in

tort,

actionable

in

our

state.

states have found that such
in

order

to

provide

The
a cause

sufficient

protection of the "substantial and important" rights involved.
precedent of this state would require a different result.

No
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B.

PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN SUFFICIENT FACTS TO
ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNDER THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN BERUBE.

Plaintiff again protests to being required to respond to
an

issue that

Defendants

are placing

argument that Defendants assert,

before

the Court.

and that of Plaintiff hereafter,

are substantially the same as were presented to and
Judge

Greene

Judgment

in

response

Defendants1

to

on this public policy

here simply

ruled upon by

Motion

cause of action.

trying to take this case

their motion was

The

unsuccessful.

for

Summary

Defendants are

from the trial court, where

That notwithstanding,

Plaintiff

presents the following argument.
Defendants

would

have

the

Court

shut

its

eyes

to

Defendant Browning's illegal conduct

and the ultimate effect that

Plaintiff's

such

refusal

employment.

engage

Defendants

Berube would find
judicial

to

first

a public

in

activity

argue that

the

policy violation only

policy

given

Plaintiff's cause
of are analogous of
610

on

his

lead opinion

in

in statute

or

opinion and that Plaintiff has failed to articulate such

a violation which led to Plaintiff's termination.
public

had

in

the

of action.

lead
The

opinion

The examples of
strongly

support

violations Plaintiff complains

those found in Tameny v.

Atlantic Richfield,

P.2d 1330 (1980) (cause of action for employee terminated for

refusing to engage in an illegal price fixing scheme) and
Petermann v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

344 P.2d 25
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(1959) (cause of

action for employee

commit

cases

perjury)

Plaintiff's

cited

allegations

are

terminated for refusing

in

the

Berube

not

like

those

lead

to

opinion.

superficial

and

transitory public policies which Berube would not recognize, i.e.,
public

policy

employment

for

to

provide

and

its citizens.

promote
Berube

maintained from the beginning that he

job security
at

1043.

and

full

Plaintiff has

was terminated for refusing

to engage in or condone illegal activity.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has never claimed he was
fired because he refused to violate any law.

This

is directly at

odds with Defendants' own fact paragraphs 4 and 5 which state that
Plaintiff

indeed

constructively

alleged

in

discharged

for

his

Complaint

opposing

that

unlawful

he

actions

was
for

conscientiously carrying out his duties as a customs and corporate
officer as required by
States.
23 and

the law of Utah and the law

Plaintiff's Complaint,
24.

Certainly

of the United

Third Cause of Action, paragraphs

this is adequate

notice under

our notice

pleading rules.
Defendants then had an opportunity to question Plaintiff
at

his

Plaintiff

deposition

regarding

indicated

that

Plaintiff's opposition

the

the basis

of

allegations

to the falsification of

these
were

allegations.
based

upon

customs documents

regarding the importation of firearm parts from Miroku Firearms of
Japan, his opposition to

the falsification of inventory valuation
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for purposes

of assessing

the Merchant's and

Manufacturer's Tax

upon the Arnold, Missouri plant inventory, his opposition to allow
Berretta Firearms of Italy to use Browning's import permit to ship
firearms

into the United States, his refusal to short cut customs

procedures in order to

transfer Browning inventory from Montreal,

Canada to the United States, and his insistence on compliance with
customs rules
clubs

and regulations

from Portugal.

detail,

Plaintiff

indicating the

going along with
measures that
Plaintiff's

regarding the importation
went into each

anger that

the illegal

of golf

instance in some

was directed

practices, and the

at him

for not

extra work

and

others at Browning had to do in order to get around
refusals to

condone

or participate

in the

illegal

conduct.
Plaintiff
telephone

testified that

call from

Ray Allen,

in late

1983, he

the president of

that Italian representatives of

received a

Browning Arms,

Berretta wanted to use Browning's

import permit to ship a considerable number of Berretta pistols to
Pennsylvania.
because

When Plaintiff told Mr. Allen they could not do it

it was illegal, Mr. Allen got extremely angry.

suggested

some

although that
hung

up on

pleading
Browning's

legal

measures

to get

was apparently not
Plaintiff.

call

from

permit.

an

Some

Plaintiff

shipment

satisfactory to

time

Italian

the

representative
refused

imported,

Mr. Allen

later Plaintiff

again

Plaintiff

received

again
the

to

who
a
use

angered
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representative.
what

Finally,

Don Gobel

the problem was with regard to

Gobel was

not pleased, but

asking

importing the shipment.

Plaintiff believes he

reason for Plaintiff's decision.
Plaintiff

contacted Plaintiff

Mr.

understood the

Peterson Deposition, pp. 188-92.

apparently

further

irritated

Browning

officials regarding the closing of the Browning plant in Montreal,
Canada.
Arnold,

The

transfer

Missouri plant

of the

inventories

required

compliance

from Canada

to

with customs

the
laws.

Morgan personnel became irritated and upset with Plaintiff because
of his insistence on strict compliance with customs procedures due
to the increased

time involved in

doing so.

Plaintiff did

agree with all directives regarding the transfers which

not

came from

Morgan and was therefore

viewed as being extremely uncooperative,

less than a team player.

Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 191-94.

There was another customs
the

importation

of

golf

clubs

problem

that arose regarding

from Portugal.

Mr.

Peterson

testified that under a Generalized System of Preferences a company
can import a commodity from a
of tariff

if the

decide to honor

State

Department and

the country

attempting to get

country at less than the going rate
the Treasury

with such treatment.

Department

Browning

was

golf clubs made in Portugal to become qualified

for

that preferential treatment.

Don

Gobel traveled to Portugal to, among other things, attempt to

iron

the problems

out.

He

sent

Problems arose in Portugal and

a

memorandum

to

Plaintiff
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outlining

the understanding which turned out to be wrong and more

delays ensued.

Plaintiff testified "Don's reaction

going along with
tell me to

to that [not

his memorandum] was not very happy.

cheat, but

accept his memo and

I knew he

was not pleased

proceed accordingly."

He did not

that I

didn't

Plaintiff subsequently

got the customs issue straightened out and Browning did accomplish
the goal it

wanted to

accomplish.

Plaintiff's Deposition,

pp.

195-96.
Plaintiff again
falsify

Jefferson

testified

that

County,

he was

unrelated subject

met with opposition when
Missouri

having

when Don

he refused to

tax documents.

a meeting

Plaintiff

with Don

Gobel

Jones, Browning's Treasurer,

on an
came in

indicating that there was a serious problem with the tax form that
had just

come in from the

Arnold plant.

The plant was

at that

time still under the management of Bob Clark who had been handling
the tax forms.

Mr. Jones indicated that if he put

figures on the tax form it would cost the
thousand dollars.
that

there

That

were problems

was the

down the right

company several hundred

first indication

with regard

to

Plaintiff had

the Missouri

tax and

inventory valuations for purposes of the tax forms at Arnold.
Plaintiff
shortly

thereafter

counsel in
Morgan

Missouri.

was sent
and

to run

discussed the

the Arnold,
problem

Missouri plant
with

Browning's

Plaintiff was told to send the tax forms to

to be filled out.

Merchandise inventories

were taken at

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
Brief of Respondent

Docket No. 400401
-24-

Arnold,
back
Don

but by

Morgan personnel, and

to Morgan.

Plaintiff stated that

Jones wanted him

amount

of inventory

to lie
that

to the

was subject

indicated to Plaintiff that it

the information

was taken

he believes that at least
county officials
to

the tax.

was a pain in the neck

about the
Mr. Jones
for Morgan

to do it and he didn't see why Arnold wouldn't go ahead and do it.
Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 182-88.
Finally,
President

Plaintiff testified

of Browning

Arms

that

Company, had

he

and Ray

gotten

Allen,

into an

angry

confrontation over the importation of pistol parts from Miroku,
Japanese

corporation.

Plaintiff objected

manifest of pistol parts
license
162.

Gobel Deposition, p.

Miroku shipment

because Browning did not have

for pistol parts from
In fact it was

to a

Japan.

an import

Plaintiff's Deposition, p.

illegal to import pistol
65-66.

a

Ray Allen was

parts from Japan.

responsible for

the

shipment and a shouting match ensued when Plaintiff confronted Mr.
Allen

and refused to change the shipping documents to incorrectly

reflect

rifle parts

which

Miroku.

This incident took place just days before Plaintiff began

receiving telephone calls
his

forced resignation

Browning could

lawfully import

from Dave Rich which
by the

end of

from

ultimately led to

that month.

Plaintiff's

Deposition, pp. 162-63.
Plaintiff has given Defendants ample notice of the above
conduct which is illegal

and which he believes ultimately

led to
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his

termination

from

Browning.

refused to condone or
not

The

engage in was illegal and

be wrongfully terminated because

with the illegal conduct.
difficult to
provide

conduct

imagine.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff should

of his refusal

to go along

A more clear public policy violation is
Defendants

Plaintiff with

which

requested

have

failed and

refused

information regarding

to

illegal

customs practices and falsifying tax forms, yet Defendants attempt
to

argue that Plaintiff does

his allegations.

This

not have sufficient

type

of hide

and seek

facts to prove
game is

clearly

inappropriate and should not be tolerated.
Defendants
personally

next

argue that

since

Don

Gobel did

not

ask Plaintiff to violate any laws, and since Mr. Gobel

and the Board of Directors were the only ones who could ultimately
fire

Plaintiff,

Defendant

Plaintiff

cannot

state

a

claim

for

relief.

Browning must, of course, act through its agents and is

ultimately responsible for the actions of those agents.
Plaintiff

believes that there

was animosity toward

him and that

the animosity was what led Mr. Gobel and Mr. Rich into forcing him
out of his employment.

Plaintiff

believes that the basis of this

animosity, however, was Plaintiff's

refusal to condone and engage

in the illegal activities of other Browning officers which conduct
is more fully set forth above.
side

Plaintiff had been a thorn in the

of various Browning officers who wanted to short cut customs

and tax

laws over the years.

As custom's officer

he refused to
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allow

the illegal importation of pistol parts from Japan and golf

clubs from
to

Portugal, and to allow

be used by

angry

Berretta of

Browning's importation license

Italy.

Plaintiff's refusals

confrontations with Browning

required

additional

personnel

who were

work

from

delayed

Defendant

in clearing

because of Plaintiff's insistence
Morgan

personnel

inventories

of the

were

officials.

also

Arnold

led to

Plaintiff further
Browning's

the Montreal

Morgan

warehouse

on complying with customs laws.
required

to

plant after

take

Plaintiff

merchandise
took over

as

manager and to prepare the tax forms on the merchandise.

This was

previously done in

A

inference that

its prior management.

Plaintiff's refusals precipitated

can be found in
customs

Arnold under

laws.

clear

the termination

the timing of Plaintiff's last refusal to violate
It

was only

a few

days after

Plaintiff's angry

confrontation with Browning Arms Company President Ray Allen, over
the

Miroku pistol

importation, that

termination/retirement.
should

be left

animosity

to the

A logical
trier of

Dave Rich
inference

fact

called regarding
can

to determine

be made

and

whether the

which led to Plaintiff's termination was as a result of

Plaintiff's failure

to "play ball"

with other managers

who were

engaging in illegal activity.
It is untenable to
interest
law.

in upholding the
When

argue that the State of Utah
principles of

confronted with

this

issue

federal or
in

has no

other state

Alder v.

American
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538 F.Supp. 572, 579 (1982)

the federal District

Court of Maryland analyzed:
This Court cannot agree that the State of
Maryland should close its eyes and, as a
matter
of policy, not be concerned with
violations of federal law.
Various courts have recognized that federal
public policy may properly form the basis for
an abusive discharge suit in a state contract.
See McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 747 F.Supp. 1111
(E.D.Pa. 1979); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610
P.2d 1330 (1980); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank,
246 SE.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978); See also Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App. 3d 311, 171
Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
No cases have been
cited to the Court holding to the contrary.
Utah citizens
because they

refuse to

who are terminated
engage in

from their employment

illegal activities, should

protected regardless of whether the law governing

them arose from

federal, state or other state statutes or regulations.
on the

party of

having to

following law that governs
the
Utah

law originates

choose between

The effect

keeping their

them, is the same regardless

from, and the

should not protect such

public policy of

conduct by an

be

job or
of where

the State of

employer against its

employee.
Judge
Addendum

Greene in

IV, ftnt.

his

1, indicates

policy exception to consist
will employee from being

of:

Memorandum
what he

Decision
interprets

and

the public

"This exception protects

discharged for a reason

Order,

or in a

an atmanner
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that

contravenes

policy."
most

In

principles

Berube this

obviously,

enactments.

sound

but

established

Court indicated that

not

Berube, 771

of

exclusively

The

public

public policy

embodied

P.2d at 1043.

and

in

is

legislative

facts of Plaintiff's

public policy based cause of action therefore, give rise to one of
the

clearest public policy based claims.

from

the

bench

on the

motions

for

Judge Greene, in ruling

reinstatement and

summary

judgments, agreed:
THE COURT:
All right.
On the motion for
reinstatement, I'm going to grant that motion.
The third cause of action, I think we are
driven by a lot of facts here. I'm satisfied
that there is a direction in Utah law which
would embrace, at least, this kind of a public
policy.
So Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the third cause of action is
denied.
Transcript

of

supplied).

August
See

16,

attached

1989,

bench

ruling,

Addendum VIII.

p.3

There

(emphasis

clearly

are

sufficient facts to support the cause of action.

C.

ERISA
DOES NOT
PRE-EMPT PLAINTIFF'S
PUBLIC POLICY CAUSE OF ACTION.

Again,
consideration of
the

trial

Defendants are improperly
this Court that

Court. In

fact,

are more appropriately

Defendants have

before

the federal trial court

there.

In

light of

submitting issues for

and it is

the denial of

briefed

left to

this issue

awaiting oral argument

Plaintiff's Motion to

Strike
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Defendants'

Brief, however,

Plaintiff

will

briefly respond

to

Defendants' arguments.
Plaintiff has successfully defended a
and

Summary Judgment Motion on

Court.

Motion to Dismiss

this very issue

before the trial

The only new authority cited is Ingersoll-Rand Company v.

McClendon,

111 S.Ct. 478, 1990 US

U.S.L.W.

4033 (December 3, 1990).

ground.

The issue is still

(and when previously

benefit plan

Ingersoll does

the same as it

decided by

Plaintiff's state law causes

Lexis 6121, 112 L.Rd2d 474, 59
not break new

was before Ingersoll

the federal trial

court):

of action "relate to"

sufficiently to require

Do

the employee

pre-emption by ERISA.

The

answer is also still the same: No.
In Ingersoll-Rand
state

law claim for

violation.
plaintiff

The Texas
could

the Court had to

wrongful termination
court had

recover in

a

held

determine whether a

"related to"

that under

an ERISA

state law

wrongful discharge

action

"a

if he

established that 'the principal reason for his termination was the
employer's

desire to

avoid

under the employee's pension
at 4034.
that

Not

contributing to
fund.'"

or paying

Ingersoll-Rand, 59 U.S.L.W.

surprisingly, the United State Supreme

"the existence

establishing liability
As a result, this

of a

pension plan

benefits, but to the essence of

Court found

is a critical

under the State's wrongful

cause of action

benefits

factor in

discharge law.

relates not merely to

the pension plan itself."

pension
Id. at

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
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-30-

4035.

The Court

makes

specific

existence

goes on to say

that "The Texas cause of

reference to,

and

of a pension plan."

I£.

indeed

is premised

action
on,

the

That is clearly not the case

at bar.
In the Texas case,
if there is no plan."
causes
plan.

of action

"there simply is n£ cause

I£.

In the

can stand

Plaintiff's

without

without

opportunity

to

to

improve,

of

without

performance

all

a pension

alleges that

in

breach

of

investigation

of

deficiencies and

an

covenants

of

the

The third cause of action basically alleges

that Plaintiff was discharged
by Browning

because he opposed unlawful actions

officials

carried out his duties
Neither state

law

without notice of dissatisfaction,

respond,

notice

employment contract.

proposed

existence of

second cause of action basically

opportunity

criticism,

case at bar, both state

without the

Defendant discharged Plaintiff

of action

and

because he

as customs officer and

law causes of

conscientiously

corporate officer.

action rely upon the

existence of a

pension plan.
Defendants

argue

second and third causes

that the

allegations

supporting the

of action intermesh with the

ERISA cause

of action.

Supposedly in support of that proposition they cite to

paragraphs

14 and

15 of

Plaintiff's Complaint.

paragraphs, however, are contained in
refer to

the ERISA

violation, and

Both

the First Cause of
have nothing

of these
Action,

to do with

the

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
Brief of Respondent

Docket No. 400401
-31-

second and

third causes

of action.

If the

Court followed

the

Defendants' argument to its

logical conclusion, an employer could

always protect itself from

wrongful termination actions by simply

maintaining
attempt
where

a

pension plan

to pre-empt

for the

the entire

employer.

range of

there is a logical "relation

ERISA

cases, but

does not
only those

to" or dependence on the plan

to support the cause of action.
Not only is the Ingersoll-Rand
as is

set forth above,

pre-emption area.
was

before the

It

decision distinguishable

but it does not

break new ground

merely reiterates the prior case

federal court

when it

law which

previously ruled

issue denying Defendants the relief they request this

in the

on this

Court grant

them.
CONCLUSION
There
this Court:

is only

that is

appropriately before

that certified by the Federal District

should follow

the overwhelming

that the cause of action
in

one issue

majority of states

Court.

Utah

and determine

for wrongful termination from employment

violation of public policy sounds in tort.
It would invade the province of the trial court for this

Court

to

apply

the

enlightened as to the

law

to

the facts

tof

this

status of the state law, the

can apply the law to the facts.

case.

Once

Federal Court

The Federal Court should likewise

be allowed to rule on the ERISA issue and determine the effect, if

PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH
Brief of Respondent

Docket No. 400401
-32-

any, of

the Ingersoll-Rand case on

the case at bar.

was not certified,

does not

Supreme Court.

any event, Plaintiff concludes that

In

sufficient facts
case is

to support

distinguishable

and should not

the action,

from this

be addressed by

and that the

case and

That issue

has no

the

there are
Ingersoll
application

whatsoever.
DATED this

/3

day of March, 1991.

/<>/
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DAVID BERT HAVAS of
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MICHELLE E. HEWARD of
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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of
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day of March, 1991.
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ADDENDUM INDEX
I.

Verified Complaint, dated 10/30/87;

II.

Order Re Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's NonFederal Claims, dated 12/21/88;

III.

Order Re Reinstatement of Third Cause of Action, Summary
Judgement Motions, denials and other orders, dated
1/23/90;

IV.

Memorandum Decision and Order, dated 1/23/90;

V.

Certification Order, dated 8/22/90;

VI.

Affidavit
in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated 4/26/89, except for attached transcriptions;

VII.

State by state case
issue; and

VIII.

Bench Ruling, 8/16/89.

law of lead cases on

public policy

Elizabeth T. Dunninq
WA^KISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171
Telephone: (801) 363-3300
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
VEPN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

u —

J
J

u

zO

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

vs.
Civil No.

<->; s s
o ;

BROWNING, a Utah
corporation, and
DAVID W. RICH,

87-NC^121G

Jury Trial Demanded

Defendants,

H 0 U

I ^

Vern L. Peterson alleqes as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Vern L. Peterson ("Peterson") is a resident of

South Oaden, Utah.
2.

Brownina is a corporation organized under the

laws of the State of Utah and having its principal place of
business in Moraan, Utah.
3.

David W. Rich is a resident of Weber County, Uta

and at all times material to this Complaint was the Personnel
Director of defendant Brownina and a member of the Committee
which is the Plan Administrator of the Employees1 Pension Plar

of Browning and other Adopting Companies ("Browning Pension
Plan").
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has jurisdiction of this action pur-

suant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§1132, and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
5.

This Court has pendent jurisdiction over plain-

tiff's state law claims because the state and federal claims
set forth arise from a common nucleus of operative facts.
6.

Venue is proper in this Court because the breaches

occurred in this district and the defendants are found in this
district.
FACTS
7.

In 1953 plaintiff Peterson began employment with

Browning as a sales correspondent.
8.

For the next 31 years Peterson continued to work

for Browning and received numerous promotions.

In 1981 Peterson

was promoted to Vice President of Browning and was appointed
Customs Officer and Corporate Secretary of Browning.
9.

In August 1982 Peterson was transferred to the

Arnold, Missouri facility of Browning as general manager.

Prior

to Peterson's transfer Browning agreed that it would continue
to employ Peterson as general manager of the Arnold facility
for six years until he reached age 60 and would pay the cost

of Peterson's relocation to Missouri and back to Utah.
10.

At all times during his employment Peterson's

performance was satisfactory.

During the time he was a vice

president, he exercised the duties of loyalty and care in the
conduct of the affairs of Browning required of a corporate of
During the time he was Customs Officer, Peterson fulfilled th
duties of that position with diligence and care.
11.

On October 31, 1984, Peterson was constructive

discharged from his employment by Browning.
y
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
12.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 11 at

13 • Defendant Rich failed to discharge his duties
with respect to the Browning Pension Plan solely in the inter
^st of participants and beneficiaries and instead manipulated
the Plan to coerce Peterson's early retirement as part of a
scheme to terminate Peterson's employment.
14.

Defendant Rich's conduct in using the Browning

Pension Plan as part of a scheme to terminate Peterson's empl
ment in violation of defendant Browning's contract with Peter
and the public policy of th ? State of Utah constitutes a brea
of defendant Rich's fiduciary duty as a member of the Committ
which is the Plan Administrator of the Browning Pension Plan
and a violation of the Employee Retirement Security Act, 29
U.S.C. §1001, et seq. (ERISA).

15,

Defendant Browning's knowing participation in

defendant Rich's breach of fiduciary duty as part of its scheme
to terminate Peterson f s employment in violation of its contract
with Peterson and the public policy of the State of Utah constitutes a violation of ERISA.
16.

As a result of defendants' conduct as aforesaid,

Peterson has lost salary, bonuses and fringe benefits, including
contributions to his Browning Pension Plan account.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
J
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17.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 16 above.

18.

Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of
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plaintiff on October 31, 1984, constituted a breach of its six-ye<
employment contract with Peterson.
19. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of

;

Peterson after 31 years of loyal and satisfactory service without

i<
in

any notice of dissatisfaction with his performance, without
any opportunity for him to respond to criticism and without
any investigation of the criticisms breached defendant Browning's
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its contract of employment with Peterson.
20.

Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of

Peterson without notice of performance deficiencies and an opportunity to improve violated Browning's policy and practice of
giving employees oral and written warnings and an opportunity
to improve prior to termination and constituted a breach of

its contract of employment with Peterson.
21.

As a result of Browning's breaches as set fort]

above, Peterson has lost salary, bonuses and fringe benefits,
including contributions to his Browning Pension Plan account.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
22.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 21 abc

23.

Peterson was constructively discharged because

he opposed certain unlawful actions proposed by other officers
and division managers of defendant Browning and because he cor
j

entiously carried out his duties as Customs Officer and as a

•

corporate officer.

D

24.

Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of

o

Peterson for exercising his duty of loyalty and care in the

<

affairs of the corporation and for conscientiously performing

<

his duties as Customs Officer as required by the law of Utah
and the law of the United States violates the public policy
of Utah and constitutes wrongful termination.
25.

Defendant Browning's wrongful termination of

Peterson has caused Peterson to lose salary, bonuses and fring
benefits, including contributions to his Browning Pension Plan
account, and to suffer mental anguish, embarrassment and humil
tion.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows:
1.

On his first claim for relief, for lost salary,

bonuses and frinae benefits, including contributions to his
Browninq Pension Plan account, with interest; for punitive damage
and for attorneys fees;
2.

On his second claim for relief, for lost salary,

bonuses and fringe benefits, including contributions to his
Browninq Pension Plan account, with interest;
3.

On his third claim for relief, for lost salary,

bonuses and frinqe benefits, including contributions to his
Brownina Pension Plan account, with interest; for general damages
W
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in an amount to be determined at trial and for punitive damages
in an amount not less than $500,000;
4.

And for costs and for such other relief as the

Court deems proper.

G
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DATED this

day of October, 1987.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
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By.
Elizabeth T. Dunninq
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-21

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
813 E. 5750 S.
Pouth Oqden, Utah 8 4 405

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
VERN L. PETERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and sta
that he resides at 813 E. 5750 S.f South Ogden, Utah 84405;
that he is the plaintiff named in the foregoing complaint; an
that he has read the foregoing complaint and that the allegations therein are true and correct to the best of his knowled
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Information and belief,
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s A O day of
October,

1987.

otary Public .
^
Notary
Re siding in ^ ^ / ^ ,^ - & ? ^ C
My commission expires:

^ ^ j ^ E I V E D CLERK
^•;i?.!f.*:ORU-i.-i
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AEWLS. DISTRICT COURT
David

R.

MnnoyBXtLqp/#fff37)

Sharon E. Sonnenr^^ttT{lisB7iT5l8)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

VERN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
NON-FEDERAL CLAIMS

vs.
BROWNING, a Utah corporation,
and DAVID W. RICH, an
individual.
Civil No. 87-NC-121G
Defendants.

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-Federal
Claims were heard before the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United
States District Court Judge, on December 5, 1988. Plaintiff
was represented by David Bert Havas and Michelle E. Heward of
David Bert Havas & Associates.

Defendants were represented by

David R. Money and Sharon E. Sonnenreich of Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough.
The court, having considered the arguments of counsel,
finds the following:

* -3 J — -. J

5T

1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs state

law claims on the basis that they are pre-empted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, et
seg. is denied;
2.

Defendants' Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss plaintiffs state law
claims on the basis that this court lacks pendent jurisdiction
is denied; and
3.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs Third

Cause of Action (Wrongful Discharge) pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is hereby granted and plaintiffs
Third Cause of Action is dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this

day of December, 1988.

Copies mailed to counsel, 12-27-88jm gy THE COURT:
Davidfi.Havas, Esq.
David R. Money, Esq.

^ tThomas
< ^Greene
A ^
United States District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David Bert Havas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION

VERN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 87-NC-121G

v.

ORDER

BROWNING, a Utah Corporation,
and DAVID W. RICH,
Defendants.

The above matter came on regularly for hearing on
August 16, 1989, upon numerous motions made by both parties.
Plaintiff was represented by David Bert Havas and Michelle E.
Heward.

Defendants were represented by David R. Money and Sharon

E. Sonnenreich.

The court heard the oral arguments of counsel

and examined extensive briefs from the parties, and now being
fully advised makes, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and
Reinstatement of the Third Cause of Action is granted.
FURTHER ORDERED:
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Third
Cause of Action is denied.
precludes summary judgment.

Dispute concerning material facts

FURTHER ORDERED:
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the
Alternative Partial Summary Judgment as to the First and Second
Causes of Action is denied.

Discovery concerning material issues

of fact in dispute should be conducted, including ambiguity as to
the meaning of "six years" in the contract sued upon.
FURTHER ORDERED:
Defendants1 Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel is granted without prejudice to the bringing of further
motions to compel and/or motions for protective orders as may be
deemed necessary, after the parties have attempted to work out
their disagreements.

In this regard, the court directs counsel

to meet together and do the following:
- Listen to the original tapes made of the
telephone conversations prior to plaintiff's termination in order
to determine and agree upon a fair and accurate transcript of
said recordings•
- Try to agree upon an appropriate arrangement for
production of documents and disclosure of bonus calculations and
income information which shall include dollar amounts as well as
percentages.

However, identities of the individuals receiving

such bonuses and income need not be disclosed.

If defense

counsel believes that the information requested or documents
involved are privileged, and an arrangement for masking out

2

certain portions cannot be agreed upon, a privilege log
identifying the matters and items claimed to be privileged shall
be filed with the court and served upon counsel.
- Determine whether counsel can agree upon what
additional information and documents should be provided in light
of reinstatement of plaintiff's Third Cause of Action.
FURTHER ORDERED:
Defendant's Motion for

Protective Order Regarding

Customs and Tax Laws is denied.
FURTHER ORDERED:
Defendants1 Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Designation of
Expert Witness is denied.

Defendants may depose the witness

beyond the existing discovery cut off date.
FURTHER ORDERED:
The court reserves ruling on the Motions in Limine.
FURTHER ORDERED:
An Amended Scheduling Order shall be prepared by
counsel for defendants which shall provide for discovery with
regard to the Third Cause of Action as well as such further
discovery as may be agreed upon by the parties.

The Amended

Scheduling Order shall be lodged with the court after compliance
with local Rule 13(e).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January
t

J// THOMAS GREENE
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES TO; l/24/90rrp:
David Havas, Esq.
David Money, Esq.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT. COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION

VERN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No. 87-NC-121G
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

BROWNING, a Utah Corporation,
and DAVID W. RICH,
Defendants.

The above matter came on regularly for hearing on
December 7, 1989 on Defendants1 Motion for Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal and Stay.

David Bert Havas and Michelle E.

Heward represented plaintiff, and Sharon Sonnenreich represented
defendants.

The court heard oral arguments and reviewed

extensive briefs.

Being fully advised, the court now enters its

Memorandum Decision and Order.
The Court denies defendants1 Motion for Certification
to the Tenth Circuit.
The issue before the Court is driven by Utah law.

It

is clear to this court that the Utah Supreme Court recognizes a

public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) ;2 Loos
v. Nature-All Corporation, 1989 Utah Lexis 146 (Utah Nov. 27,
1989) . The majority in Loose said:

"The post Berube exceptions

to the employment at will doctrine in Utah include termination
violation of public policy, . . . "

Howcroft v. Mountain States

Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 712 F,Supp. 1514 (D. Utah April 28,
1989), cited by the defendants is not inapposite.
policy exception recognized in Berube

The public

was not at issue in

Howcroft and Judge Anderson did not rule upon or even discuss it
This Court rules that an action for wrongful
termination based upon the public policy exception to the at-wil
employment doctrine is an action founded upon tort rather than
contract.

The general rule in states recognizing such an

exception characterize it as the tort of wrongful discharge.3
1

This exception protects an at-will employee from bein
discharged for a reason or in a manner that contravenes soun
principles of established and substantial policy.
2

Although there was no majority opinion in Berube, th
Plurality opinion as well as Justice Zimmermann's concurrenc
indicated willingness to recognize a public policy exception.
3

Arthur S. Leonard in his law review article, A New Commo
Law of Employment Termination, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66
631 (1988) reviews reported cases and says: In Order to prevent a
employer from acting contrary to an important public policy, som
state courts have recognized a tort of "wrongful discharge11 as a
exception to the at will presumption,
. • . Courts faced with
public policy argument have searched for an existing label to plac
on the resulting legal action. They have most frequently describe

The clearest statement which appears to indicate the direction of
Utah law on this matter is Justice Durham's plurality opinion in
Berube:

"Where an employee is discharged for a reason or in a

manner that contravenes sound principles of established and
substantial policy, the employee may typically bring a tort
action against his employer" (emphasis added).

Berube at 1042

The rulings set forth in this memorandum decision and
order will become the law of this case unless within 30 days
after the date hereof a party or the parties jointly, on motion
supported by memorandum and necessary documentation, request this
court to certify the issues to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

If such a

motion is filed, the court will set the matter for argument.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

January ^r\h

1990.

'^$iu<A y\k\xt^^

J./TffOMAS 6REENE
INCITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES TO: cnsl 1/24/90MP:
David Havas, Esq.
David R. Money, Esq.

i t as a t o r t
658-662.

of w r o n g f u l

discharge.

..."

(emphasis added)

Id.

at

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION

VERN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 87-NC-12
CERTIFICATION ORDE!

BROWNING, a Utah Corporation,
and DAVID W. RICH,
Defendants.

TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT:

This court hereby certifies the following question of
law to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, Rule 41:
1. Does an action for termination of employment based
upon the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine, for violation of or refusal to violate federal, other
state, or Utah law, sound in tort or contract?
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 30, 1987, plaintiff Vern Peterson filed a
complaint against his former employer, Browning, and its
personnel director, David W. Rich (hereafter "Defendants"),
alleging three causes of action related to the termination of h
employment with Browning: (i) violations of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act; (ii) breach of employment
contract; and (iii) wrongful termination in violation of Utah
public policy.

In support of his public policy claim, plaintiff

alleges, inter alia, that his employment was terminated because
of his opposition to the falsification of inventory tax documents
in violation of law, including the laws of the State of Missouri
where he was employed by Browning at its Arnold, Missouri, plant;
and because of his opposition to the falsification of customs
documents in violation of federal customs laws in connection with
his duties as customs officer for Browning.
Plaintiff's public policy claim was dismissed by this
court on August 16, 1989 pursuant to a motion filed by Defendants
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In light of the

Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Berube v. Fashion Center. 777 P.2d
1033 (Utah 1989) , plaintiff moved for restoration of the public
policy cause of action, which motion was granted by this court
after extensive briefing and oral argument.

Defendants then

filed a motion for certification of the issue for interlocutory
appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which was denied.
The actions of this court in reinstating the public policy cause
of action and denying the request for an interlocutory appeal to
the Court of Appeals are reflected in an Order dated January 23,
1990, attached hereto.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CERTIFIED QUESTION
The question certified to the Utah Supreme Court
presents an issue of substance and controlling law in the pendi
federal case.

Plaintiff claims to have been discharged because

of his refusal to violate federal and state law in violation of
Utah public policy.

This claim has to do with alleged refusal

violate federal and foreign state law (Missouri), and possibly
Utah law as well, as implicating Utah public policy.

This clai

enlarges this action from a contract and ERISA case that focuse
on a discrete set of facts to such things as inquiry into
Browning's customs and tax practices.

Whether the claim sounds

in contract or tort is important because the public policy clai
is the only cause of action for which plaintiff seeks punitive
damages.
This action, like many others brought in federal cour
involves a wrongful termination claim under Utah law

which is

pendent to the basic federal jurisdictional claims.

We are awa

that the plurality opinion in Berube sets forth an explanation
regarding the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.

This court would be greatly aided by instructions fr

the Utah Supreme Court as to whether the public policy exceptio
for violation of or refusal to violate law embraces federal and
foreign state law, and whether it sounds in tort or contract.
Based on the foregoing, the above referenced issue is
certified to the Utah Supreme Court for consideration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

August "Q/2- , 1990,

ljJNylTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES TO:

mr
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
August 24, 1990
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
Re:

l:87-cv-00121

True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to t
following:
David B Havas, Esq.
2 6 04 Madison Avenue
Ogden,, UT 84401
David R Money, Esq.
170 South Main Suite 1500
Salt Lake City,, UT 84101

DAVID BERT HAVAS (1424) and
MICHELLE E. HEWARD (5084) of
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2604 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
Telephone:
(801)399-9636

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

Civil No. 87-NC-121G

VERN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BROWNING, a Utah corporation,
and DAVID W. RICH,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
SS

COUNTY OF WEBER)
VERN L.

PETERSON, being first duly sworn upon his oath

deposes and states as follows:
1.

He is the Plaintiff in the above captioned case.

2.

In 1982 he was informed by Defendant Browning that

he would be relocated to the Browning, Arnold, Missouri Plant and
became the General Manager of that facility.
3.

As part of the agreement to move he

and Defend

Browning entered into a written employment contract dated 7/1/82,
entitled "Company Relocation Procedure
Peterson

in

regard

to

his

Plant", a copy of which is
Points

and

Authorities

Transfer

attached to
in

and
to

Agreement

with Vern

the Arngld, Missouri

Defendants1 Statement of

Support of their Motion for Summary

Judgment or, In the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment.

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment

Civil No. 87-NC-121

-24.

In 1982

Plaintiff moved

himself and

his wife t

Arnold, Missouri, under the terms of the employment contract.
5.

Plaintiff

entered

into

the

employment contrac

believing that the employment contract provided

for a

period o

employment of six years.
6.

Plaintiff

negotiated

a

six

year

contract

employment in order, amongst others, to complete enough
service so
program.

o

years o

as to allow him to retire with an adequate retiremen
Plaintiff made this fact known to Defendant Browning a

the time he agreed to his reassignment to Arnold, Missouri.
7.

Plaintiff worked

for Browning at Arnold from 198

until October, 1984 when he had several conversations
Rich

and

Don

Gobel

which

ultimately

led

with Davi
Plaintiff1

to

termination from Browning.
8.
Plaintiff
Rich

From October 18, 1984,

taped

and/or

eight

Don

telephone

Gobel.

through October

30, 1984

conversations held with Davi

Transcripts

of

those

telephon

conversations are attached to this document and marked as Exhibi
A-l through A-8.
9.
and

to

the

Affiant has
best

of

read the

his

transcripts attached heret

knowledge

they are true and correc

transcriptions of the telephone conversations above referred to.
10.
refers to

In

the

a "moccasin

first

telephone

telegraph" as

feelings directed at Plaintiff

by

Ron

conversation

Mr.

Ric

causing a

build up of ba

Mosier.

Plaintiff wa

.^^x^wr. v. DKuwfiiNb AND RICH

Civil No. 87-NC-121G

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment
-3concerned over

the influence that Mosier had over Don Gobel, the

president of the

company,

and

whether

Gobel

would

rely upon

Hosier's comments.
11.

Mr. Rich indicated to Affiant that if Browning was

going to get rid of Plaintiff, that "Early retirement is
out,"

and

that

in

"reading

between

the way

the lines... this is the

beginning of the end rather than just an incident."

Rich went on

to state that Plaintiff was in "a no-win situation back there [in
Arnold] as well as a no win situation here."
12.
"in a

Mr. Rich

box", created

described Plaintiff's

by animosity

others over the years.

position as being

directed at him by Mosier and

The situation, or box, was exacerbated by

Mosier being Gobel's best friend.
13.

Mr. Rich

indicated that

he saw

the same type of

trap being formed for Plaintiff that

had led

of two

Jim Butts and Peter Wilson.

former Browning

Rich had a "gut
happen."

employees:

reaction

something

like

to the termination

that

[v/as]

about to

That early retirement was the best way out.
14.

Plaintiff indicated

know... I'm being forced out."

to Rich

To which

that "you and I both

Mr. Rich

replied "Yeh.

That's right."
15.

Plaintiff believed that he was being forced out of

his position with Browning and had

no option

but to

accept the

early retirement offer.
16.

After

discussing

facets

of

the

burden

the

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment

Civil No. 87-NC

-4retirement would place'on Plaintiff, he stated "if you feel t
if I interpret from you correctly,
make the

offer.

confirmed by

I'm just

Rich,

17.

...I don't

not going

"That's

what

I

it.

Plaintiff

advantage of and was
time it

is a

to fight
read

it."

between

Which
the lin

Rich indicated that an offer should be made be

closed doors for Plaintiff to retire,
accept

stand a praye

made

it

on the

fair fight,

take a shot at it, but

and that

Plaintiff sh

clear that he was being t

"short end

of the

stick".

"[i

I'm willing to roll up my sleeves

when

I'm

outnumbered

I

feel

like

Custer at Little Big Horn."
18.

The following day, Plaintiff called Mr. Rich wh

it was confirmed that Mr. Gobel had made up his mind to termin
Plaintiff, and
to fruition.

that the

"moccasin telegraph" had brought thi

That the decision had been

made for

several we

or months.
19.

After Plaintiff

contacted Mr. Richf who

returned from a vacation he ag

indicated

that

the

retirement pack*

Browning was offering was almost put together.
20.

Mr. Rich

(Trans. 5, p.

indicated that Plaintiff did not have

take the retirement, but then added that from what he
reading between

the lines,

could "s

and what [he'd] heard and what Got

said, yes, offer it to him because he thinks it is the best thi
too."

The

conversation

continued with Mr. Rich acknowledgi

that the "handwriting" already indicated he

would be terminate

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants*
Motion for Summary Judgment

Civil No. 87-NC-121G

-5and

that

Gobel

indicated

Plaintiff was in a no-win situation.

(Trans. 5, p. 2 ) .
21.

In the

next phone

conversation, after discussing

the offer Browning was making to Plaintiff, Plaintiff asked if he
would get fired if he

refused

to

accept.

Mr.

Rich replied,

"Well, I would not say that's the immediate alternative.
I read between the

lines, I

mean he

[Gobel] has

No, but

not said that

directly to me, well, if he doesn't take it, then we'll terminate
him.

But that's what I read between the lines."

(Trans.

6, pp.

11-12) .
22.

The

final

telephone

with Browning management which
Gobel, Dave

conversation

he taped

Plaintiff had

was initially

with Don

Rich was conferenced into the telephone conversation

after a period of time.
23.
was not

Plaintiff had no plans

for

early

retirement and

ready to retire at the time that Defendants indicated he

should accept early retirement or be fired.
24.
on the

Plaintiff recalls being told that the

writing was

wall, that if he challenged the early retirement he would

be opening a can of worms, and that it would only be
months before

a matter of

he was terminated if he failed to accept the early

retirement offer.
25.
didn't

have

Plaintiff expressed his concerns to Gobel
a

choice

but

to

accept

early

Plaintiff v/as being forced out and he didn't

that he

retirement, that

know why,

and that

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment
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-6as

he

understood

his

options,

he would be fired if he did

accept early retirement.
26.

Gobel's

Plaintiff was

only

that his

criticism

meetings were

which

were

relayed

too long and he tended

pontificate.
27.

Plaintiff was sent

to

Arnold,

Missouri,

in t

midst of a "cesspool of morale" problems which culminated in a
week strike, the
admitted

he

first

did

not

strike
expect

the
to

company
receive

ever

had.

Got

glowing reports fr

personnel in light of the Company problems in which Plaintiff w
thrust.
28.

Plaintiff expressed

not have

a choice

however,

in

a

29.

but to

financial

his concern again that he d

take early
position

retirement.
to

take

He was no

early retiremen

After a lengthy discussion in which

Plaintiff w

advised of various rumors and bad feelings which had been level<
against him, Mr. Peterson expressed surprise that he had not be<
confronted with

the allegations before so that he would have h<

an opportunity to respond and/or

correct

the

problems

if th<

existed.
30.

After

analogizing

the

swell of animosity towai

Mr. Peterson to that which arose against former
Interior James

Secretary of tt

Watt, Mr. Rich indicated "The momentum is so muc

against you, like President Reagan said, no I don't want
you

but

the

best

alternative

for

you

to fir

is early retirement.

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
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Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment
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-731.

Mr. Gobel

indicated that the retirement they were

offering Plaintiff was a
offered in
future.

"one-time

deal"

that

had

never been

the past and which he doubted would be offered in the

Plaintiff then replied that he had

no choice,

he would

have to take it.
32.

After Plaintiff indicated he didn't believe it was

fair but that he had no choice but to take
Gobel indicated

he could essentially try to get to the bottom of

the rumors and get everything on
that would

early retirement, Mr.

only make

the table.

He thought, however

matters worse and not accomplish anything.

He didn't see another alternative for Plaintiff.
33.

Plaintiff believes,

and

therefore

states, that

Mr. Gobel f s statement that he could essentially try to get to the
bottom of

the

rumors

and

get

everything

on

the

table, was

facetious in

light of Mr. Gobel's prior attitude and statements,

and

in

further

accomplish

light

anything

of
and

his
he

statement
saw

no

that

other

it

would

not

alternative

but

retirement for Plaintiff.
34.
Mr. Rich

The information which was relayed to

and Mr.

backstabbing,
against him

Gobel regarding

rumors,
came as

lack

feel

and

the animosity against him the
support

and

general

attitude

a surprise to Plaintiff since up until that

time he was unaware of these
to

of

Plaintiff by

believed

that

circumstances.
these

intolerable working condition for

him

Plaintiff was made

circumstances
and

he

presented an

believed

it was

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
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-8impossible

for

him

to

continue to work for Defendant Brownin

under these conditions.
35.
or Mr.

Plaintiff had not been advised by

either Mr. Ric

Gobel of the general attitude towards him and the genera

conditions affecting
Plaintiff

had

a

Plaintiff,

six

year

notwithstanding

employment

the

fact tha

contract with Defendan

Browning of which Mr. Rich and Gobel were aware.
36.
Board

of

Plaintiff believed

Directors

or

would have authority to
believed

that

Mr.

anyone

that

Don

as

perhaps th

acting with authority from the

terminate him.

Rich,

Gobel,

Specifically, Plaintif

personnel manager, if acting wit

authority from Don Gobel, would have

the authority

to terminat

Plaintiff.
37.

When requested

to provide his wifef

by Brov/ning

signature on a single life annuity agreement, Plaintiff would nc
do so

because that

was not part of the early retirement packac

offered to him in October, 1984.
38.

Plaintiff believed, based

upon

the conversatior

he had with David Rich and Don Gobel, that he would be terminate
if he did not accept

the

early

retirement

package

offered I

Browning.
39.

Prior

Rich and Don Gobel

to

his

which is

telephone
reflected in

conversation with Davi
transcript 8 attach*

hereto, Plaintiff believed he was functioning well in his job,

PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH
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Motion for Summary Judgment
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-9and that

no major

problems with

regard to

his job performance

existed.
Further, Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this .^G7'^day of April, 1989.

L/&U*
rERSON
VERN L. PETEI
Plaintiff/Affiant
VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
COUNTY OF WEBER)
I, VERN L. PETERSON, being first duly sworn, say that I
have

read

Memorandum
Judgment

the
in
and

foregoing

Affidavit

Opposition
that

the

Affidavit is true and

to

in

Support of Plaintiff's

Defendants'

information

correct to

Motion

for

Summary

set forth in the foregoing

the best

of my

knowledge and

belief and for those items which are based upon belief, I believe
them to be true.

VERN L. PETERSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
April, 1989, by Vern L. Pe^euMyyi.

#<?/

before

me

Y/\XU<^I .
%. ^

#i—/

this

-J?^

dav

of

A y , i,/w ( ; (•• V

\—ffipARY PUBLIC;

3 KATHY GRAHAM Rfesiding/ a t : C ' M ^ ' , ( ' '
|^\vT
r—\
/ ~-2T,
~ W Commission E x p i r e s :

n

o

/~)/^/*/
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-10CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby
true and
Support

certify that

correct copy
of

Plaintiff's

of the

above and

foregoing Affidavit i

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants

Motion for Summary Judgment
Sonnenreich of

T caused to be hand delivered

to

David

R.

Money

and

Sharon E

Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Attorneys fo

Defendants, 1500 First Interstate

Plaza, 170 South Main Street
J/J
Salt Lr1"? City, Utah 84111, on this
Q^
day of April, 1989

IS/

/U/E/f

The

following

states

have

expressly

recognized a wrongful termination or retaliatory

or

impliedly

discharge claim

as a result of public policy violations, based in tort:
ARIZONA, Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d
1025, 103*6 ( 1985) (termination for refusal to commit act which
might constitute indecent exposure), Wagner v. City of Globe, 722
P.2d 250 (1986) (good discussion re recognizing exceptions to atwill rule);
CALIFORNIA, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331
(1980);
COLORADO, Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Assn, 765 P.2d
619, 622 (Ct.App. 1988) (employee discharged for exercising a
specifically
enacted
right
or
duty),
Winther
v.
DEC
International, Inc., 625 F.Supp 100, 104 (D.ColcT 1985) (applying
Colorado law, cause of action is a tort);
CONNECTICUT, Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d
385, 388-89 (1980) (termination for insisting employer comply
with food and drug laws);
HAWAII, Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982)
(fired because testimony before federal grand jury might be
damaging to employer);
ILLINOIS, Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877
(1981) (termination for giving information to police in criminal
investigation);
INDIANA, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428
(1973) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim),
Scott v. Union Tank Car, 402 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(wrongful discharge action is a tort);
IOWA, Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560
(1988) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim);
KANSAS, Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d
1981) (retaliatory discharge);

186, 193 (Kan. App.

KENTUCKY, Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733
(1984) (violation of fundamental and well defined public policy);
Addendum VII

MARYLAND, Kern v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 504 A.2d 1154
(Ct.App. 1986) (recognizes public policy based cause of action,
but not in facts of this case), Alder v. American Standard Corp.,
538 F.Supp. 572, 579 6c 580 (D.Md. 1982) (good discussion re
federal law as source of public policy);
MICHIGAN, Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 347 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Ct. App.
1983) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim against
employer) although a separate panel of the Court of Appeals ruled
in a 1988 case that termination in retaliation for filing a
worker's compensation claim sounds in contract, not tort.
See
Lopas v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757 (1988);
MINNESOTA, Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588,
592 (Ct.App"! 1986) (violation of federal law basis for public
policy);
MISSOURI, Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878
(Ct.App. 1985) (federal law FDA regulations were basis for public
policy);
MONTANA, Nye v. Dept. of Livestock, 638 P.2d 498, 502 (1982) (But
1987 legislation requires employer to discharge only for good
cause and not in retaliation for refusing to do an act violative
of public policy or in violation of personnel policy);
NEVADA, Hanson
v.
Harrah's,
675 P.2d 394,
396 (1984)
(termination for filing worker's compensation claim);
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436
A.2d 1140, 1143^
1146 (1981) (refers to prior
cases as
establishing tort based cause of action for violation of public
policy);
NEW JERSEY, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505,
512 (1980) see also Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d
1292 (1988) (tort and contract remedies available);
"
NEW MEXICO, Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (Ct.App. 1983)
(revised on other grounds), see also Chavez v. Manville Products
Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (1989) (Court of Appeals may have been overly
cautious in
initial recognition
of cause of
action for
retaliatory discharge);
NORTH CAROLINA, Sides v. Duke Hospital, 328 S.E.2d 818, 830 (App.
1985), rev, denied, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985) (terminated for refusal
to testify untruthfully in Court), see also Coman v. Thomas Mfg.
Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989) (Supreme Ct. upholds Sides reasoning);
NORTH DAKOTA, Krein v. Morian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793,
795 (1987) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim);
OKLAHOMA, Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2D 24, 28 (1989) (violation
of public policy set in constitution, statutes or case law gives
rise to tort);

OREGON, Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114, 116
(1984) (terminated for refusal to sign potentially defamatory
statement)?
PENNSYLVANIA, Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119
(1978) (terminated for jury duty), Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d
571, 577 (1986) (public policy violation gives rise to a tort);
RHODE ISLAND, Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F.Supp 134
(D.R.I. 1988) (Concludes Rhode Island would recognize public
policy based cause of action citing Volino v. General Dynamics,
539 A.2d 531 (1988));
SO. CAROLINA, Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337
S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985) (terminated for honoring subpoena to grand
jury investigation);
TENNESSEE,
(1984);

Clanton v.

Cain-Sloan

Co., 677

S.W.2d 441,

444-45

TEXAS, Sabine v. Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733
(1985) (discharged
for refusing to
perform illegal act),
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, (1989) (Court
acknowledges damages for mental anguish and punitive damages);
VIRGINIA, Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801
(1985), Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F.Supp
1332 (E.D. Va. 1987) (discusses and applies Va. law)?
WASHINGTON, Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089
(1984) (termination for complying with law);
WEST VIRGINIA, Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d
(1982) (refusal to violate consumer protection laws);

692, 701

WYOMING, Griess v. Consolidated Freightways, 776 P.2d 752, 754
(1989) (terminated for filing worker's compensation claim).

Of those states recognizing a public

policy exception,

the following states provide contract remedies for such cause

of

action:
ALASKA, Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123
(1989) (violations ol public policy considered breaches of
implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, implies
contractual remedies);
ARKANSAS, Sterling Drug, Inc v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988),
reh den. 747 S.W.2d
579 (1988) (public policy violations
predicated on breach of implied provision not to discharge for an

act done in public interest);
MICHIGAN, Lopas v. L & L Shop Rite, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757 (1988)
(termination for filing a worker's compensation claim sounds in
contract).
WISCONSIN, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
In the
ascertain

following states

whether the

Plaintiff has been

recognized public

policy based

unable to
cause of

action sounds in tort or contract:
IDAHO, Staggier v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 715
P.2d 1019 (Ct.App. 1986);
MASSACHUSETTS, Hobson v. McLean Hospital Corp. 522 N.E.2d 975,
978-979 ftnt. 3 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1988), DeRose v. Putnam Mgmt. Co.,
496 N.E.2d 428 (1986) (good discussion re measure of damages tort
no holding);
NEBRASKA, Ambroz v. Cornhuskers Square, Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510
(1987), Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755 (1988);
VERMONT, Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (1986);
The following

states have not adopted

a public policy

exception to at-will rule:
ALABAMA, Reich v. Holiday Inn, 454 S.2d 982 (1984) (case did not
Present justification to modify at-will rule), but see Scholtes
v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 487 (W.D.Arlr: 1982)
(held Arkansas would recognize exception to at-will rule);
DELAWARE;
FLORIDA, Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators,
42 7 S.2d 182 (1983) (but statutes already prohibit employer
retaliation for voting, jury service, whistle blowing and filing
worker's compensation claims);
GEORGIA;
LOUISIANA,
1982);

Gil v.

Metal Service

Corp.,

412 S.2d

706 (Ct.App.

MAINE;
MISSISSIPPI, Laws v. Aetna Finance Co.,
(D.N. Miss. 1987) (Mississippi
would

667 F.Supp. 342, 348
adopt public
policy

exception to at-will rule);
NEW YORK, Murphy v.
(N.Y.App. 1983);

American Home Products Corp., 448

N.E.2d 86

OHIO, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 491 N.E. 2d 1114 (1986)
(refuses to recognize exception on these facts but see dissent
analysis of tort vs. contract issue);
SOUTH DAKOTA, Abrogated employment at-will by statute;
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1989, 2:00
* * *
THE COURT:

All right.

On the motion for reinstates

I'm going to grant that motion.
The third cause of action, I think we are drivei

6

by a lot of facts here.

7

direction in Utah law which would embrace, at least, this

8

kind of a public policy.

9

judgment on the third cause of action is denied.

10
11
12

I'm satisfied that there is a

So Defendant's motion for summa

Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, remsta
ment is granted.
The Defendant's motion for summary judgment in

13

general is denied, and its motion as to the first: cause o

14

action and second cause of action is denied.

15

there are material issues of faot that need to be explore

16

and developed.

17

ambiguous on the issue of the meaning of the six years.

18

am inclined to agree with Mr. Money that the weight of tt

19

evidence may lean toward an explanation of that term as

20

related only to relocation, but I'm also convinced that i

21

are other plausible explanations.

22

those could be the position that's* been taken here relat

23

to a term of art.

24
25

I believe

I also consider the express contract to t

In any event, one of

The Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's
motion to compel is granted with this understanding:

I

1

think the parties should get together and talk about this

2

and see what's left, and nov; that we've got a ruling on the

3

third cause of action.

4

together, you've got to sit down and listen to the original

5

tapes and quit trying to compare a reconstruction of a copy

6

of the original tape with a transcript in the possession of

7

Mr. Havas from the original tape.

8

reconstructed transcript is, at least, in part, a work

9

product.

Then in the spirit of getting things

I do think that the

So do that and see where you are with respect to

10

the matter of bonus calculations and things of that nature,

n

whether the documents need to be produced or ma^be they

12

need to be excised so as to preserve identity,

13

confidentiality.

14

something in that regard.

15

can go with the percentages as well as they could with

16

dollar amounts because they have a right to do it the way

17

they want to do it.

18

by the fact that there may well be confidential information

19

here and things that need to be protected, and if there is

20

something that is sought that counsel believes to be in the

preserve

I would think counsel could work out
It isn't an answer to say they

But I think that's all to be tempered

21 I category of privilege, work product or confidential informa22 | tion that ought to be produced, you ought to create a
23 | privilege log and we ought to talk about a new motion to
24 | compel, if that's necessary.
25 |

The motion to compel the answer is denied.

1

The motion to strike is granted with the m s t r

2

tifans that counsel get together and see what they can dc

2

work out these discovery matters.

4

I suppose the motion with respect to the custo

5

and tax laws, except as to the motion in limine relative

g

it, is subsumed by these rulings.
As to the motion to strike Plaintiff's designa

7
8

I of expert witness, I'm going to permit that expert witne

9

to be deposed and to stand as an expert witness.
I would like to know what remains.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
IS
19

I would ra

not open discovery generally, but it looks to me like we
need to have a period of time for discovery as to the ma
raised in the third cause of action.

We need to have an

opportunity for discovery with respect to this designate
expert.
Is there anything else as to which discovery w
be required by either side?
MR. MONEY:

May I take it that our renewed motion f

ERISA pre-emption is denied as well?

20

TRE COURT:

Yes, it is.

21

MR. HAVAS:

I believe as far as discovery, Your Hon

22

discovery has been reserved, and, then, the expert and t

23

third cause of action is all that I can see.

24

MR.* MONEY:

That's correct, Your HonQr.

25

THE COURT:

As to the third cause of action and the

1

expert, Chris Lewis, is that --

2 |

MR. HAVAS:

No.

And there is a couple -- a number of

3

depositions of stipulation we have reserved pending ruling

4

here, I believe three.

5

THE COURT:

I think maybe what you ought to do is

6

to —

let's have two orders, one reflecting the rulings of

7

the Court on the pending motions, and another as an amended

8

scheduling order that will define the discovery that you

9

both have agreed may now be conducted.

If you want to just

10

outright agree between you that it's to be extended

11

generally, that's fine.

12

that.

13

generally but that it go for the third cause of action and

14

this expert witness, and anything th^t you have already

15

agreed upon, that may be done.

16

broader than that, put it in the ord&r.

17

leave it at that, let's have an understanding what will be

18

done.

19

But I'm not suggesting that you do

The order of the Court is that it not be open

Nov;, if you want to make it
If you want to

How much time do you want %o complete that?

20

MR. HAVAS:

Complete discovery dr complete the order?

21

THE COURT:

Well, with respect to completing the order,

22

I'll give you until 5:30.

23

MR. HAVAS:

That's generous of the

24 J

THE COURT:

I was really thinkirta of completing

25 I discovery.

What do you need?

Court.

Do you need more than 30 days?

1

MR. HAVAS:

I believe we do.

2

MR. MONEY:

We would agree with that.

3

MR. HAVAS:

I would think three months is probably

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

time

—
MR. MONEY:

Honor.

I would agree with that as well, Your

We're not as contentious as we seem with each oth

THE COURT:

Do you want to take until the first of

December to complete discovery?
MR. HAVAS:

I think we might be able to get it finis

before then, but that will be a good time.
THE COURT:

Why don't we do that. If there's -- if y

12

can f t work it out by your sitting down and talking on the

13

discovery matters, we'll need to have to, perhaps, talk

14

again about that.

15

scheduling conference on December the 18th at 11:30.

16

at that time, we'll be in a position, I would presume, to

17

set a pre-trial and move this case into a trial posture.

18

But we'11 have a further status and
Now

in your amended scheduling order, I think you

19

ought to define what the main discovery is to be.

You ca

20

prepare that, Mr. Money, and have Mr. Havas sign off on i

21

I'll ask Mr. Havas to prepare the general order

22

with respect to the rulings of the Court and have that

23

submitted to Mr. Money for his approval as to form.

24

that order you prepare, Mr. Havas, ought to make note of

25 I a couple of reserved things that we haven't ruled on.

I th

I

1

suppose there are notions in limine

2

MR. HAVAS:

Very well, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Is there anything further now?

4

MR. MONEY:

No, not from us, Your Honor.

5

MR. HAVAS:

Nothing further.

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.

7

All right.

Thank you.

We're in recess.

8

(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)

9

* * *
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21
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